Many decisions made by authorities pose uncertain consequences for the individuals affected by them, yet people must determine the extent to which they will support the change. Integrating the social justice and behavioral decision theory literatures, the article argues that individuals determine their support for proposed initiatives by assessing how knowledgeable they feel and using 2 main sources of information more or less heavily: their prediction of how the outcome of the initiative is likely to affect them or the perceived fairness of the decision maker. Three studies (2 experiments, 1 longitudinal field survey) assessing support for proposed public policies reveal that when individuals feel very knowledgeable they rely more on their prediction of how the outcome will affect them, whereas when they feel less knowledgeable they rely more on an overall impression of procedural fairness. The theoretical account and findings shed interdisciplinary insights into how people use process and outcome cues in reacting to decisions under uncertainty and ambiguity.
Leaders, arbiters, corporations, governments, and other decision-making entities often propose policies, initiatives, or rules. Whether it is a new governmental or consumer policy, a reallocation of resources, or an announcement of a merger, many decisions made by authorities pose uncertain consequences for the individuals who are affected by them, yet people must still look to the future and determine the extent to which they will support the change. Under such conditions of ambiguity, what is the basis for how people react to decisions with uncertain consequences and determine their support for initiatives? This investigation integrates the fields of social justice and behavioral decision theory to assert that people determine their support by assessing how knowledgeable they feel and drawing on two main sources of information more or less heavily: their prediction of how the consequences of the initiative are likely to affect them or the perceived procedural fairness of the decision maker. The theoretical account takes an interdisciplinary perspective of how people react to decisions with uncertain consequences, introducing subjective knowledge as a critical moderator of the extent to which people draw on process versus outcome cues.
When reacting to proposed initiatives, it stands to reason that people base their support in part on an uncertain judgment, or prediction, of whether the outcome is likely to be favorable or unfavorable. Indeed, fundamental social psychological theories of reasoned action and planned behavior (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) rely on people being able to form clear beliefs or expectations about the positive or negative outcomes that will result from particular actions. Moreover, classic decision theory and the field of behavioral decision making, which have their roots in expected utility theory (Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) , have strongly emphasized the importance of anticipated outcomes in determining choices and behaviors. Decision theory approaches to the study of judgment under uncertainty rest on people being able to engage in a calculation of expected consequences by considering the probability and valence of a particular outcome. Some decision research has also suggested that people's willingness to act on their forecasts can be affected by how knowledgeable or competent they feel (Fox & Tversky, 1995; Fox & Weber, 2002; Heath & Tversky, 1991) . Thus, to the extent that people feel sufficiently knowledgeable when making a prediction about the consequences of a proposed initiative, they should presumably treat their prediction as a useful source of information in determining their support.
However, in many decision contexts individuals must act on the basis of predicted outcomes without feeling sufficiently knowledgeable concerning that prediction. A perceived lack of knowledge would thus create ambiguity and render one's prediction as a less reliable cue, necessitating the use of other cues to determine reactions and support. Social psychologists have long demonstrated that a robust predictor of reactions to decisions made by authorities is perceived procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibault & Walker, 1975) . Across a wide variety of contexts, justice studies have shown that individuals respond more posi-tively if they believe that the outcomes they receive are determined with fair decision-making processes and procedures (e.g., Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001; Folger, 1977; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibault & Walker, 1975) . Moreover, people are especially sensitive to process fairness when they are unable to evaluate aspects of their social context, such as the trustworthiness of the decision maker (e.g., Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997; Van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998) . This stream of findings suggests that people draw on procedural fairness judgments as a heuristic substitute for missing information; and in this way, fairness can serve a general function of managing informational or personal uncertainty Van den Bos, 2001 ; Van den Bos & Lind, in press) .
Building on the complementary yet distinct insights of the social justice and behavioral decision theory literatures, this article provides a unified theoretical account examining how people's subjective sense of their own knowledge dictates reliance on the two sources of information discussed above: their prediction of how the consequences of the initiative are likely to affect them and their heuristic assessments of the procedural fairness of the decision maker. In particular, the present account asserts that people rely on their own uncertain forecasts if they feel relatively knowledgeable. Otherwise they draw on different, more social or process-oriented cues, such as procedural fairness, which has not typically been considered in prior decision-making research. The current investigation also departs markedly from prior social justice investigations, which have usually assessed the influence of process and outcome judgments on individuals' reactions after both the process and outcome are experienced (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996) . Whereas prior justice accounts have provided a largely retrospective analysis of the way people react to processes and outcomes that have already transpired, the present account offers a prospective psychological analysis of the way in which people draw on procedural fairness judgments versus forecasted outcomes when decisions are proposed and consequences are anticipated.
Understanding the way subjective knowledge moderates the effects of forecasted outcomes and fairness perceptions can identify important boundary conditions for both the justice and decision-making literatures, yielding new psychological insights into the way people react to decisions under uncertainty and ambiguity. The account is tested in three studies providing evidence from diverse public policy contexts that include both controlled laboratory experiments and longitudinal field survey data.
Low Subjective Knowledge Increases Reliance on Procedural Fairness
When reacting to the actions of authorities or institutions, people are sensitive to the decision-making processes that result in particular outcomes. One robust example of the importance of process perceptions has been found in the social justice literature. Specifically, the fair process effect, in which individuals are more accepting and satisfied with an outcome if they believe the process used to determine the outcome is fair, has been demonstrated in a wide variety of policy, legal, and organizational contexts (for reviews, see Colquitt et al., 2001; Folger, 1977; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Greenberg & Folger, 1983; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibault & Walker, 1975) . In addition to the capacity for fair procedures to increase satisfaction with received outcomes, fairness judgments have been shown to affect a variety of other dependent measures, such as trust, favorable attitudes toward authorities and leaders, and organizational citizenship behavior (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Colquitt et al., 2001; Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & de Vera Park, 1993) .
Several investigations of fairness heuristic theory provide evidence that fairness judgments are more predictive of reactions when people are missing information or unsure of the social context (e.g., Van den Bos et al., 1997 , 1998 . For instance, Van den Bos et al. (1998) found that procedurally fair treatment had an impact on satisfaction with an outcome received by an authority when participants were given no information on the trustworthiness of the authority, whereas fairness had no effect on those who were given either positive or negative trustworthiness information. Other empirical tests have documented that procedural fairness is weighed more heavily when individuals lack social comparison information about others' outcomes relative to when they are provided with such information (Van den Bos et al., 1997) .
Furthermore, an experimental investigation of primacy effects in the formation of justice judgments revealed that fair treatment encountered early in a relationship was more influential than the same information encountered later (Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 2001) . In a field study of promotion and tenure decisions, Ambrose and Cropanzano (2003) similarly found that the impact of procedural justice (relative to distributive justice) was more influential prior to and just after outcome decisions were made. These findings imply that people draw on procedural fairness at points in time when they presumably have the least information or certainty about another party or the ultimate outcome. Interestingly, simply asking people to think about nonspecific uncertainty seems to heighten emotional sensitivity to procedural fairness interventions. Van den Bos (2001) asked people to write about how uncertainty makes them feel physically and emotionally and found that individuals who were primed in this general way exhibited more extreme emotional reactions to subsequent fair and unfair treatment relative to those who had not been primed.
Recent theoretical work has attempted to account for the range of findings discussed above by providing the general explanation that people rely on fairness information more when they are relatively uncertain, and as such fairness serves as a way to buffer or manage uncertainty Van den Bos, 2001 ; . Van den Bos and Lind (in press) assert that fairness is a tool for resolving both informational uncertainty (when one is missing information) and personal selfuncertainty (arising from doubt or instability in self-views, world views, or the interrelation between the two). Yet overall, the notion of uncertainty has been conceptualized and interpreted quite broadly in justice research.
As discussed in more detail in the subsequent section and the general discussion, the current article draws on a specific conceptualization of uncertainty that is grounded in behavioral decision theory. Because the focus of the investigation is on situations in which individuals must attempt to determine their support for initiatives with uncertain consequences, it involves a forecast or prediction about how they might be affected by the outcome. In addition, the present account presumes that, when making these predictions, individuals will sometimes feel they are not suffi-ciently knowledgeable, which creates uncertainty or ambiguity. For example, research on political choice indicates that many people lack knowledge about the personal or broader social implications of policies or leaders and hence may rely on ideological cues as a basis for making decisions (e.g., see Bartels, 1996 Bartels, , 2005 Conover & Feldman, 1989; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991) . Employees in organizations may similarly feel far removed from strategic decisions with complex and unclear consequences, such as layoffs or resource allocations. A perceived lack of knowledge in such situations would constitute a source of uncertainty or ambiguity for people.
It is important to note that the knowledge variable in this article is an inherently subjective, internal assessment that is malleable (e.g., Fox & Weber, 2002; Kagan, 1972; . Therefore, the focus here is not on how an actual objective level of information or knowledge (as could be measured on a test) might drive reliance on procedural fairness, but rather it is on a subjective assessment of how knowledgeable people feel in the particular domain at the time they try to forecast what the consequences will be.
On the basis of the fairness heuristic theory findings reviewed above, perceived procedural fairness is hypothesized to have more influence on support for an initiative for individuals who perceive that they have low knowledge in a particular domain relative to people who feel they are very knowledgeable. Feeling devoid of knowledge when considering a decision made by an authority or institution should render one's prediction about the outcome as a less reliable piece of information and in turn heighten sensitivity to other, more social or procedural cues, such as fairness perceptions. Although other cues may be available and used by people when they lack knowledge, it is conceivable that procedural fairness is a particularly salient and useful cue because it is a multidimensional construct. Procedural fairness signals the quality of the decisionmaking system (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980) as well as socially rich information about group inclusion, identity, and adherence to moral and social rules (Folger, 1998; Tyler & Lind, 1992) . In other words, if individuals must respond to an initiative and do not feel knowledgeable when trying to assess how it might unfold, they can try to resolve this ambiguity by considering their perception of the soundness of the decisionmaking process or system that generated the initiative.
High Subjective Knowledge Increases Reliance on Outcome Predictions
Forming expectations about the positive or negative outcomes that will result from particular actions is a basic aspect of prominent social psychological theories (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) and cognitive decision theories (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) . As such, when people assess proposed institutional decisions, one of the pieces of information they might consider is the way they could be affected. Making an outcome prediction and subsequent decision to support the proposed decision is akin to a naturalistic judgment under uncertainty.
1 The decision theory and behavioral decision-making literatures provide many insights into how people act under uncertainty. The section draws on research on judgment under uncertainty and ambiguity to conceptualize knowledge as a moderator and explain how it is hypothesized to influence reliance on predicted outcomes.
In the field of decision theory, both normative and descriptive decision theoretic approaches were founded on principles of expected utility theory (Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) . These approaches emphasize the importance of people's preferences over particular outcomes, their assessment of how likely those outcomes are to occur, and the psychological means by which they evaluate outcomes (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) . In the present article, reacting to institutional decisions with uncertain consequences entails a prediction about an outcome (i.e., "How will this affect me?"), as well as an assessment of one's knowledge concerning the domain of prediction (i.e., "How knowledgeable do I feel making this prediction?").
Although it is reasonable to expect that people's reactions might be influenced by the valence of their forecasted outcomes, the descriptive study of judgment under uncertainty and ambiguity suggests that people are reluctant to act on their forecasts unless they feel relatively competent or knowledgeable in the domain or subject area they are assessing (Chow & Sarin, 2002; Ellsberg, 1961; Fox & Tversky, 1995; Fox & Weber, 2002; Frisch & Baron, 1988; Heath & Tversky, 1991; Kunreuther, Meszaros, Hogarth, & Spranca, 1995) . As such, subjective knowledge in this article is most similar to psychological interpretations of how ambiguity is experienced in the behavioral decision-making literature. With some exceptions (e.g., Kunreuther et al., 1995) , much work on ambiguity has used basic gambling paradigms without a social context, in which participants have the choice of betting on their uncertain judgments of the outcome of events, such as upcoming sporting events or changes in economic indicators (e.g., Fox & Weber, 2002; Heath & Tversky, 1991) . Thus, the present article extrapolates from the basic line of reasoning in the area of judgment under uncertainty and ambiguity to assert that subjective knowledge determines the extent to which individuals draw on outcome predictions to determine their support for institutional initiatives.
Specifically, predicted outcome favorability should have more influence for individuals who perceive that they have high knowledge in a particular domain, relative to those who feel less knowledgeable. Note that this interaction between knowledge and outcome prediction is in the opposite direction as the hypothesized interaction between knowledge and fairness. That is, if individuals feel relatively confident or certain in their knowledge, it renders their forecasted outcome as a relatively reliable piece of information and heightens sensitivity to that prediction. But when people feel they have less knowledge, it renders their outcome prediction as a noisier cue, and they weigh their procedural fairness judgment more heavily.
It is important to highlight that a great deal of social justice research has considered the role of outcome favorability judgments in conjunction with procedural fairness (for a review, see Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996) . However, in the justice literature the dependent measures are typically assessed after both the process and outcome are realized. These are largely empirical settings in which people have already received the outcome, and hence the consequences are known and there is no uncertain forecast or assessment of one's knowledge to be made. Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) reviewed and synthesized a wide variety of independent samples showing an interaction between procedural justice and (experienced, or certain) outcome favorability when the dependent variable was support for a decision or entity, documenting that procedural justice has a stronger effect when outcome favorability is low. The authors posited that the interaction occurs because encountering an outcome that is unfavorable elicits sense-making and attribution processes that direct people's attention toward procedural fairness information as a way to explain the basis for the outcome.
Theoretically, such an attribution account suggests a retrospective analysis that occurs once the outcome is reasonably determined and assimilated. In other words, when making sense of an unfavorable outcome that is already known or transpired, people look to both process and outcome evaluations and weigh one more or less heavily depending on the level of the other (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996) . The present account, in contrast, offers a prospective analysis of how people make sense of an outcome that is anticipated in which uncertainty has been highlighted, and the article uniquely argues that people assess their internal feeling of knowledge and subsequently rely more on fairness information (when they feel less knowledgeable) or their prediction about the outcome (when they feel more knowledgeable) to determine their support. The hypothesized moderating effects of knowledge are tested in the following three studies.
Study 1
The first study asked undergraduate students at a private southeastern university to read a brief description of a real environmental policy being proposed by the state government. This policy was selected because participants would presumably perceive its subject, the issue of water quality in a nearby part of the state, to be important and potentially relevant to them. However, it was not likely to be a policy about which people had a great deal of information in advance of the study, thus providing an opportunity to (a) capture natural variation in people's predictions about the policy outcome and (b) manipulate their subjective knowledge in the context of the experiment. Procedural fairness of the state government and predicted consequences of the policy were measured variables, and the dependent variable was their degree of support for the proposed policy. The central hypotheses concern the statistical interaction between knowledge and procedural fairness and the interaction between knowledge and predicted outcome favorability. Procedural fairness should have more influence on policy support for those made to feel less (relative to more) knowledgeable, whereas predicted outcome favorability should have more influence on policy support for those made to feel more (relative to less) knowledgeable.
Method
Participants. Participants were 119 undergraduate students at a small private southeastern university. Participants were recruited at the student union and were paid a total of $3 for a bundle of unrelated tasks that took approximately 15 min to complete.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three knowledge conditions: high-subjective knowledge, low-subjective knowledge, or a control condition.
Procedure. The experiment was administered using paper and pencil. All participants were asked to read the following short description of the proposed public policy:
For this study you will be assessing a proposed environmental policy that affects [your state], potentially including [your university]. Specifically, the state government is proposing a plan to improve water quality in the [region] of [state] . The coastal rivers and estuaries of [state] have been showing signs of problems associated with nutrient pollution, including a growing number of fish deaths and an increase in algae growth clouding the water. Several sources of nutrient pollution affect the water in [state] , including the rapid growth of cities, agricultural pesticides and fertilizers, and pollution from industrial waste. If these problems are not adequately addressed, they could have human health effects for the state. To address these potential human health risks, the [state law making agency] is considering a policy that would attempt to reduce the amount of pollution by X% over the next X years.
After reading about the policy, participants encountered the knowledge manipulation. The knowledge manipulation drew on past research showing that people's willingness to bet on their own forecasts can be affected by comparisons to others who might be more knowledgeable (Fox & Tversky, 1995) , presumably because such comparisons alter people's confidence in their own knowledge. In the present study, participants' attention was drawn to other groups of people evaluating the policy who would automatically be perceived by undergraduates as either more or less than knowledgeable than themselves. Depending on the references made, implicit social comparisons should either enhance or undermine participants' subjective sense of their own knowledge. Participants assigned to the low-knowledge condition were told of a relatively more knowledgeable group of respondents: "Please indicate your responses to the short survey below. We will also be administering this survey to experts in environmental science and chemistry." Participants assigned to the high-knowledge condition were told of a relatively less knowledgeable group of respondents: "Please indicate your responses to the short survey below. We will also be administering this survey to [local city] high school students taking a political science course." Finally, there was a control condition in which no referent group was mentioned. Using a subtle social comparison to manipulate knowledge is advantageous in this context because references to other respondents should have no logical impact on evaluations of the decisionmaking authority, the policy itself, or predictions of the outcome. The manipulation should affect only participants' confidence in their own knowledge, thus providing a pure manipulation of subjective knowledge.
After the knowledge manipulation, participants answered the dependent variable and two additional measured independent variables in counterbalanced order. All variables had a 7-point ordinal response scale (1 ϭ not at all, 7 ϭ extremely) and an "I don't know" response option, with the exception of the attitude control variable discussed below. The dependent variable follows previous justice research (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Colquitt, 2001) and was an item assessing support for the proposed initiative. Specifically, the item asked participants to what extent they would "support having the proposed policy become part of the state's laws to control water pollution in the [region] ." The measured independent variables included a global procedural fairness judgment about the entity proposing the initiative and a prediction of the consequences of the policy. The fairness variable asked participants to indicate their agreement with the statement: "The procedures used by the state government to makes laws are fair." Higher ratings for the fairness variable reflect the perception that the government is procedurally fair. The measure of predicted outcome favorability asked participants to indicate whether "the proposed policy is likely to be very favorable" to people like them. Higher ratings for the outcome prediction indicate a higher perceived likelihood that the outcome of the policy would be favorable to the participant.
Finally, a control variable and manipulation check were included. The control variable assessed general environmental attitude, as such attitudes are often embedded in values or factual information that can influence how people respond (Eagly & Kulesa, 1997) . This wording of the item was as follows: "There are differing opinions about how far we've gone with environmental protection laws and regulations. At the present time, do you think environmental protection laws and regulations have gone too far, not far enough, or have struck the right balance?" (1 ϭ gone too far, 2 ϭ struck the right balance, 3 ϭ not far enough). Participants were asked to indicate how "knowledgeable" they felt about "environmental issues and problems" on a 7-point scale to check the knowledge manipulation. Higher values on this item reflect greater confidence in one's knowledge in the domain of assessment.
Two interaction terms were used to test the hypotheses: the interaction of the fairness item and the knowledge factor, and the interaction of the predicted outcome item and the knowledge factor. Before creating the interactions, the knowledge factor was coded as -1 for the low-knowledge condition, 1 for the highknowledge condition, and 0 for the control condition. The procedural fairness and predicted outcome variables were meancentered to reduce correlation among interaction terms and their associated variables in the analysis (Aiken & West, 1991; Jaccard & Wan, 1996) . The two interactions terms were created by multiplying the knowledge factor by each of the mean-centered measured variables.
Results
Manipulation check. Mean self-reported ratings of knowledge were compared between conditions to assess whether the knowledge manipulation was successful. As intended, participants in the highknowledge condition rated themselves as significantly more knowledgeable (M ϭ 3.97) than those in the low-knowledge condition (M ϭ 3.30), F(1, 77) ϭ 4.27, p ϭ .042, 2 ϭ .05. The control group gave knowledge ratings that were in the middle of the other two conditions (M ϭ 3.57). Results of analysis of variance (ANOVA) polynomial contrasts revealed a significant linear trend for mean knowledge ratings for the three conditions, F(1, 116) ϭ 4.8, p ϭ .031, and a nonsignificant quadratic trend (F Ͻ 1).
2 No significant effects of the condition variable were found for the two measured independent variables at either the multivariate or univariate level. In addition, no order effects were found at the multivariate or univariate level. Analysis. The dependent variable is a one-item ordinal measure, thus all hypotheses were tested using both ordered logit and multiple regression analysis. The results were virtually identical, and only the regression results are reported here because of ease of interpretation. The dependent variable (policy support) was run in the model first with the attitude control variable and the independent variables: the knowledge factor, procedural fairness, and outcome prediction. In Step 2, the two-way interaction terms (Knowledge ϫ Fairness and Knowledge ϫ Outcome Prediction) were added.
As shown in
Step 1 of Table 1 , the procedural fairness judgment (B ϭ 0.20, SE ϭ 0.09, p ϭ .04) and outcome prediction (B ϭ 0.30, SE ϭ 0.08, p Ͻ .001) variables had significant main effects and were positively related to support for the proposed policy. More critically, Step 2 of Table 1 provides the test of the hypotheses and reveals that the main effects were qualified by two significant interactions: the Knowledge ϫ Fairness term (B ϭ -0.30, SE ϭ 0.13, p ϭ .02) and the Knowledge ϫ Outcome Prediction term (B ϭ 0.35, SE ϭ 0.12, p ϭ .004).
4 Note that the two interaction coefficients have opposite signs, indicating that they have the expected opposite effects as a function of knowledge.
2 Coding the knowledge factor as 1, 0, 1 (low, control, and high, respectively) assumes that the variable falls along the knowledge dimension in a linear fashion, which appears to be supported by the significant linear trend for the knowledge manipulation check item. As a more direct test of linearity, a second orthogonal nonlinear term coded -1, 2, -1 (low, control, and high, respectively) was added to the model at various stages to test whether it accounted for additional variance beyond the original linear factor. The nonlinear contrast had no significant effect when included at any step of the analysis and did not result in any additional explained variance (⌬R 2 ϭ -.004, ns, for Step 1; ⌬R 2 ϭ .016, ns, for Step 2 of Table  1 ). Moreover, none of the results materially change (i.e., both hypotheses remain supported) when the nonlinear contrast is accounted for in the model. 3 The randomized order of variable measurement resulted in some participants answering the dependent variable (policy support) before the two measured independent variables (procedural fairness and outcome prediction). Three dummy variables were created to code for each of the four possible orderings to ensure that there was no untoward effect of this procedure. When the order variables were run along with the condition variable in a MANCOVA, none of the order variables significantly affected the dependent or independent variables at the multivariate or univariate level. Also, when added to both steps of the analysis in Table 1 , none of the order variables were significant ( ps Ͼ .28), and their presence in the models resulted in a nominal reduction in explained variance (⌬R 2 ϭ -.10, ns, for Step 1; ⌬R 2 ϭ -.15, ns, for
Step 2). As a separate test, the orderings were collapsed into a single dummy variable to code for whether the dependent variable was administered before or after the independent variables. This dummy variable also had no effect on the dependent or independent variables, was not significant when included in either step of the analysis in Table 1 ( ps Ͼ .8), and did not explain additional variance (⌬R 2 ϭ -.09, ns, for both Step 1 and
Step 2). Moreover, none of the results materially change (i.e., both hypotheses remain supported) when order is accounted for in the model. 4 When all possible two-way interactions were included in the regression model for Study 1 as a test of the stability of the results, the Knowledge ϫ Fairness interaction (B ϭ -0.28, SE ϭ 0.13, p ϭ .035) and Knowledge ϫ Predicted Outcome interaction (B ϭ 0.30, SE ϭ 0.12, p ϭ .014) remained statistically significant and virtually unchanged, whereas the Fairness ϫ Predicted Outcome interaction falls short of significance (B ϭ -0.11, SE ϭ 0.07, p ϭ .10).
Separate regressions were used on the low-and high-knowledge conditions using only the environmental control variable, procedural fairness, and outcome prediction to probe the nature of the interactions. For low-knowledge individuals, neither the environmental attitude control variable (B ϭ 0.68, SE ϭ 0.47, p Ͼ .17) nor the predicted outcome variable (B ϭ -0.17, SE ϭ 0.35, p Ͼ .62) was significant, but the fairness coefficient (B ϭ 0.71, SE ϭ 0.31, p ϭ .034) was positive and significant. For the high-knowledge individuals, the environmental attitude control variable was marginally significant (B ϭ 0.61, SE ϭ 0.32, p ϭ .066) and the procedural fairness coefficient was not significant (B ϭ 0.06, SE ϭ .014, p Ͼ .66), whereas the prediction of outcome favorability was highly significant (B ϭ 0.61, SE ϭ 0.12, p Ͻ .001). This pattern of results shows strong support for the hypotheses.
The hypothesized interactions are displayed in Figure 1 . Following Aiken and West (1991) , the interactions were graphed using the slopes from the regression on the overall sample (Step 2 in Table 1 , including covariates), plugging in values for the x-axis at the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and one standard deviation above for procedural fairness or predicted outcome. As can be seen in the top panel of Figure 1 , procedural fairness had a much greater effect on policy support for those who reported low knowledge relative to the high-knowledge group. Figure 1 (bottom panel) also shows that outcome favorability had a much greater effect on policy support for those who are more knowledgeable relative to those who are less knowledgeable.
Discussion
The findings from this experiment provide support for the hypothesized moderating role of knowledge in determining the extent to which people rely on their procedural fairness judgment or their outcome prediction to determine their support for a proposed policy. Although the hypothesized pattern is that the effect of fairness decreases and the effect of predicted outcome increases at higher levels of knowledge, this is not to say that fairness and predicted outcome favorability should necessarily lose significance at high and low levels of knowledge. However, the results happened to demonstrate a particularly strong pattern, such that low-knowledge individuals relied only on their procedural fairness judgment, whereas high-knowledge individuals relied only on their predictions of outcome favorability in this study.
The interaction between knowledge and predicted outcome extends research on competence effects in judgment under uncertainty and ambiguity (e.g., Fox & Tversky, 1995; Fox & Weber, 2002; Heath & Tversky, 1991) by demonstrating that when people do not feel competent they will shift away from their prediction and instead draw on social or procedural information cues, such as fairness or other aspects of the decision process. The significant interaction between knowledge and fairness also extends research on fairness heuristic theory by showing that in addition to substituting for missing trust (Van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998) , 1997) , fairness can be used when domain knowledge is perceived to be lacking. This pattern of results emerged despite a very subtle manipulation of uncertainty that drew on implicit social comparisons to alter subjective feelings of knowledge. Finally, these results extend research in social justice on the joint effects of process and outcome by considering those sources of information in a context in which outcomes are unknown and consequences are anticipated, which is further elaborated in the general discussion. Despite the strong support for the hypotheses, one consideration of the current study is that the design included both manipulated and measured independent variables, thus providing less control relative to experiments with all variables manipulated. The following experiment seeks to improve on the first study by manipulating all of the factors to establish greater causal evidence of the hypothesized relationships.
Study 2
The second study asked undergraduate and graduate students at a large private eastern university to read a brief description of a proposed bank lending policy that could affect personal and student loans in their geographic region. The stimulus was chosen because student participants presumably find it relevant to them both at the time they participate in the study and in the foreseeable future. The dependent variable was their degree of support for the proposed policy. All three independent variables of interest (subjective knowledge, procedural fairness judgments, and predicted outcome) were manipulated. As before, the hypotheses concern the statistical interaction between knowledge and procedural fairness and between knowledge and outcome favorability prediction.
Method
Participants. Participants were 156 students at a large private eastern university. Participants were recruited to come to the behavioral lab and paid a total of $6 for a bundle of unrelated tasks that took approximately 25 min to complete.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (high vs. low knowledge) ϫ 2 (procedural fairness vs. unfairness) ϫ 2 (favorable prediction vs. unfavorable prediction) betweenparticipants factorial design.
Procedure. The experiment was administered on a computer. All participants were asked to read on screen the following short introduction to a proposed lending policy:
For this study you will be assessing proposed legislation that could affect many kinds of loans granted to people in [your state] (including some personal and student loans). Specifically, the [State] Assembly is proposing a plan that would influence loan underwriting guidelines. The amount of debt carried by the average American has increased by more than 50 percent since 1990, due in large part to increasing mortgage, credit card, and education debt. In order to maintain consumer financial integrity, the [state] government is considering legislation that would attempt to reduce the amount of household debt over the next five years.
Participants then advanced to a new screen, which provided more information related to evaluation of the policy. The information they encountered constituted either the manipulation of procedural fairness or the manipulation of predicted outcome favorability. The information for each manipulation was presented on a separate screen in an order that was randomized within the computer program for each participant.
The manipulation of procedural fairness involved reading a short blurb on citizen reactions to the decision-making process used by the entity to determine the policy. The information included language indicating whether or not the decision processes were in line with established antecedents of procedural justice perceptions, such as consistent procedures, bias suppression, accuracy, and stakeholder representation (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Colquitt, 2001; Leventhal et al., 1980) . For example, participants randomly assigned to the procedural fairness condition read that the policy-making process was positively viewed by citizens as "unbiased and accurate" and included "the input of people who could be affected by the legislation." Participants in the procedural unfairness condition were given the opposite information that reflected citizen criticisms indicating that the policy-making process was biased, inaccurate, and did not include stakeholder input.
The outcome prediction manipulation was designed to subtly highlight to participants the potential for the policy to have either favorable or unfavorable effects on people like them (i.e., students and recent graduates), while conveying uncertainty. Specifically, the only difference between the high and low predicted outcome conditions was whether participants were prompted to consider "the potential degree of positive effects" (favorable prediction condition) or "the potential degree of negative effects" (unfavorable prediction condition) that the policy might have on them. It was important to alter people's uncertain forecasts (or predictions) about future outcomes, rather than provide information that they treated as known (certain) outcome favorability, because past research (e.g., Schroth & Shah, 2000) has speculated that particularly strong or clear outcome expectancies can be interpreted by participants as an actual certain outcome. Thus, to remind people of the uncertainty inherent in any forecast, all participants were first told that "it is difficult to say for certain what effects the proposed policy could have on college students and recent graduates" and that "economic indicators like inflation rates, unemployment, and the current yield on 10-year treasury bonds" were among the many factors that could be relevant in predicting potential effects of the policy.
After encountering the procedural fairness and outcome prediction manipulations, subjective knowledge was manipulated in a manner similar to Study 1. Participants assigned to the lowknowledge condition encountered a screen with the following statement, which was designed to remind them of individuals who would be perceived as relatively more knowledgeable about the lending policy in question: "Next please answer the following questions. We will also be administering this survey to Wall Street experts in economics and financial analysis." Participants assigned to the high-knowledge condition read a statement that was designed to remind them of individuals who would be relatively less knowledgeable about the lending policy in question: "Next please answer the following questions. We will also be administering this survey online to freshman high school students taking a political science course." Participants clicked on a button on the screen to continue on to the questions.
Participants were then asked questions pertaining to the dependent variable and the manipulation checks. Unless otherwise noted, all ratings for these items were made on 7-point scales, with higher ratings indicating greater agreement with the question. The dependent variable assessed support for the proposed policy and was similar to that of Study 1. Specifically, participants indicated the extent to which they would "support having the proposed policy become part of the state's laws to control bank lending practices" in their geographic location. Then to assess the effectiveness of the manipulations, participants answered a series of items that were presented in a random order for each participant. The procedural fairness manipulation was checked by asking participants to respond to the statement: "The decision making procedures used by the state government are fair." The manipulation of predicted outcome favorability was assessed by asking participants to respond to the statement: "The proposed policy is likely to be very favorable to people like me." Participants were asked to respond to the following question to check the knowledge manipulation: "How knowledgeable do you feel about finance and economic issues" (1 ϭ not at all knowledgeable, 7 ϭ extremely knowledgeable).
Several control variables were included. General attitudes toward financial legislation was assessed by asking participants whether they thought that "financial laws and regulations have gone too far, not far enough, or have struck the right balance" (1 ϭ gone too far, 2 ϭ struck the right balance, 3 ϭ not far enough). The remaining control variables were age, gender (1 ϭ female, 0 ϭ male), and whether the participant was a resident of the state currently considering the policy (1 ϭ resident, 0 ϭ nonresident). When the participants had answered all of these questions and had completed the other experiments in the lab session, they were debriefed and paid for their participation.
Results
Manipulation checks. A 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was run on the three manipulation check items. For the procedural fairness item, the analysis yielded only a main effect of the fairness manipulation, F(1, 148) ϭ 6.90, p ϭ .01, p 2 ϭ .05. As expected, participants in the fairness condition agreed more with the statement that the government uses fair decision-making procedures (M ϭ 3.9) than did participants in the unfairness condition (M ϭ 3.4). For the outcome prediction item, there was only a significant main effect of the outcome manipulation, F(1, 148) ϭ 4.24, p ϭ .041, p 2 ϭ .03. Participants who had been prompted to focus on the uncertain, potentially positive effects of the policy agreed more that the outcome was likely to be favorable to them (M ϭ 4.2) than did participants who were prompted to focus on uncertain, potentially negative effects (M ϭ 3.6). Finally, for the knowledge item, the analysis yielded only a main effect of the knowledge manipulation, F(1, 148) ϭ 5.00, p ϭ .027, p 2 ϭ .03. Participants in the high-knowledge condition rated themselves as significantly more knowledgeable about finance and economics (M ϭ 3.9) than those in the low-knowledge condition (M ϭ 3.4). These results show that the three manipulations were successful at influencing the independent variables as intended.
Analysis. The raw means for policy support by each condition are presented in Table 2 . A 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 univariate ANOVA was conducted on support for the proposed policy, which included age, gender, residency, and attitude as covariates. As shown in Table 3 , the analysis revealed a main effect of outcome prediction, F(l, 144) ϭ 8.16, p ϭ .005, p 2 ϭ .05, a marginal main effect of procedural fairness, F(l, 144) ϭ 2.77, p ϭ .098, p 2 ϭ .02, and no main effect of knowledge (F Ͻ 1). It is important that these effects were qualified by two significant interactions: the interaction of knowledge and procedural fairness, F(l, 144) ϭ 4.16, p ϭ .043, p 2 ϭ .03, and the interaction of knowledge and outcome prediction, F(l, 144) ϭ 4.52, p ϭ .035, p 2 ϭ .03. ANOVAs were used separately on the low-and high-knowledge conditions to examine these interactions. As hypothesized, the effect of procedural fairness was stronger in the low-knowledge condition, F(l, 70) ϭ 6.63, p ϭ .012, p 2 ϭ .09, than in the high-knowledge condition (F Ͻ 1). In contrast, the effect of outcome prediction was stronger in the high-knowledge condition, F(l, 72) ϭ 4.52, p ϭ .037, p 2 ϭ .06, than in the low-knowledge condition (F Ͻ 1). These findings show strong support for the hypotheses and are graphically depicted in Figure 2 .
Discussion
The results of this experiment show strong support for the hypotheses in a controlled lab environment with all variables manipulated. The findings mirror the previous study and indicate that when people feel they lack knowledge their support for proposed initiatives is more strongly influenced by variations in procedural fairness, relative to when people feel they are knowledgeable, in which case their support is more strongly influenced by their predicted outcomes. The following study seeks to further enhance the relevance and implications of the findings from the first two experiments by testing the hypotheses in a field setting in which there are real consequences. Specifically, a panel survey was administered twice to individuals in the general population about to be directly impacted by a new public policy under consideration.
Study 3
This study uses a two-wave panel survey from a sample of households in a region of a southeastern state that was targeted by the real proposed water quality policy described in Study 1. As with repeated measures designs in experimental research, the panel nature of the survey controls for intra-individual variance (the tendency for a given participant to respond in a consistent way across time) and measurement error, thus providing greater reliability of results than purely cross-sectional survey data. In combination with the causal evidence from the previous two experiments, the current study provides an opportunity to test the generalizability of the results in a real-world setting, yielding richer evidence for the theoretical account advanced in this article. 
Method
Participants. The dataset comprised 332 individuals in the general population living within three counties in the affected region of the state. The sample was identified using randomly generated lists of telephone numbers in selected urban, rural, and suburban zip codes within the region. Demographics of the sample mirrored census statistics for this region of the state. Fifty-three percent of respondents were women, and 70% of respondents were Caucasian, 27% were African American, and 3% identified another racial or ethnic group. Respondents' ages ranged from 18 to 87 years (median ϭ 44). Annual household income ranged from under $10,000 (12%) to over $100,000 (5%), with the median falling in the upper end of the $25,000 to $35,000 category.
Design. The study uses a longitudinal panel survey design, in which the identical survey instrument was administered on two occasions, approximately 15 months apart, to the exact same panel of individuals. At both times the survey was administered, the policy was proposed and still under development, thus the outcome was never realized within the time frame of the study. The variables for the present investigation were measured using items embedded in a longitudinal survey instrument intended for a different investigation, which queried respondents on their environmental protection attitudes and self-reported behaviors (e.g., recycling), political activity, past experience with government officials, and preferred sources of public policy and scientific information.
Procedure. The surveys were conducted by telephone, and the total interview time for each survey was approximately 30 min. Most of the survey items use a 4-point response scale with a separate "I don't know" response option. Participants were mailed a check for $15 for completing the phone survey the first time and an additional $30 for completing the phone survey the second time.
Variables. The dependent variable comprised the mean of the responses to three specific items measuring support for different components of the policy. The components of the policy pertained to reducing pollution from three different sources: agricultural sources, city and industrial waste, and housing development. For each of these components of the overall policy, participants rated how strongly they would "support having this become part of the state's laws to control pollution in the [region]" (1 ϭ disagree strongly, 4 ϭ agree strongly). The reliability for the three items was .70, thus they were averaged into one overall measure of support for the policy.
The wording of the independent variables was similar to the measured variables used in Study 1 and the manipulation checks of Study 2. Participants were asked to indicate their agreement with the following statement to measure global procedural fairness perceptions: "Overall, the way the state legislature makes laws is fair." The outcome prediction measure asked participants to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statement: "The outcome of the policy is likely to be very favorable to people like me." Both of these items were rated on a 4-point scale (1 ϭ disagree strongly, 4 ϭ agree strongly). Knowledge was measured using a self-report item: "How much do you feel you yourself know about environmental issues and problems?" (1 ϭ nothing, 4 ϭ a lot). Finally, a time variable was included as a control in all analyses to indicate the first and second survey responses (1 ϭ first response, 2 ϭ second response). 
Results
Descriptive statistics. Table 4 presents the means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations among the variables pooled across the two time periods.
Analysis. Before analysis, the procedural fairness, predicted outcome favorability, and environmental knowledge variables were mean-centered, and the two interactions terms were created by multiplying the mean-centered variables. Pooled cross-sectional time-series linear regression was used to take advantage of the panel nature of these data (Hsiao, 1986) . 5 Each respondent answered all independent and dependent variables on two occasions, and this analysis pools both waves of data treating each observation on each respondent as a separate case. The individual respondent is then included as a separate panel (i.e., repeated group) variable to take into account variation caused by the same individual responded on two occasions. A mixed effects model was used in which the respondent variable was specified as a random effect, and all of the independent variables (knowledge, procedural fairness, and predicted outcome) were specified as fixed effects. Treating participant as a random effect assumes that our random sample of the population can be used to make inferences about people in general. Note that the random effect for individual participant is controlled for in the analysis but not estimated directly or reported.
Treating the independent variables as fixed effects controls for measurement error and all stable characteristics of an individual respondent that might affect responses on those items, including characteristics that are not observed or measured. Thus, panel survey data analyzed with fixed or mixed effects modeling shares many properties and benefits with repeated measures designs in experimental research. The mixed effects analysis yields standard regression coefficients for the independent variables that are estimated directly and presented in Table 5 .
The dependent variable (the policy support scale) was regressed on the independent variables in two steps. The time variable and three independent variables were entered first, followed by the focal interaction terms. The chi-square change was significant at each step, as is the full model, 2 (6, N ϭ 640) ϭ 115.8, p Ͻ .001. As shown in Table 5 , procedural fairness (B ϭ 0.08, SE ϭ 0.03, p ϭ .012) and predicted outcome (B ϭ 0.22, SE ϭ 0.03, p Ͻ .001) were positively related to support for the initiative. More important, the Knowledge ϫ Fairness interaction coefficient (B ϭ -0.10, SE ϭ 0.04, p ϭ .013) and the Knowledge ϫ Prediction interaction coefficient (B ϭ 0.10, SE ϭ 0.05, p ϭ .04) were statistically significant, in support of both hypotheses. 6 The two-way interactions were probed using the method and associated internet utility discussed in Preacher, Curran, and Bauer (2006) , which calculates simple slopes for the effects of the procedural fairness and outcome prediction variables at specified values of knowledge as well as regions of significance tests. In this case, the simple slopes were analyzed at the mean level of knowledge and one standard deviation above and below the mean. The analysis of the interaction between knowledge and procedural fairness revealed that the effect of fairness on policy support is significant at the mean level of knowledge (B ϭ 0.08, SE ϭ 0.03, p ϭ .013) but has the strongest effect when knowledge is a standard deviation or more below the mean (B ϭ 0.14, SE ϭ 0.04, p Ͻ .001) and is not significant when knowledge is one standard deviation above mean knowledge ratings (B ϭ 0.01, SE ϭ 0.04, p Ͼ .79). The interaction between knowledge and outcome prediction revealed that the effect of predicted outcomes on policy support is significant at the mean level of knowledge (B ϭ 0.22, SE ϭ 0.03, p Ͻ .001) but has the strongest effect when knowledge is a standard deviation or more above the mean (B ϭ 0.29, SE ϭ 0.05, p Ͻ .001) and becomes nonsignificant when knowledge is more than one standard deviation below mean knowledge ratings (B ϭ 0.11, SE ϭ 0.06, p ϭ .06). The simple slope analysis supports the hypothesized pattern, such that as knowledge increases the effect of fairness on policy support decreases while the effect of outcome prediction increases.
The regions of significance tests specify the entire range of the values of the knowledge moderator for which the slopes of fairness and predicted outcome are statistically significant. The region of significance test indicated that fairness had a significant effect on support when the mean-centered value of knowledge fell outside of the positive range (i.e., values below zero), whereas outcome prediction had a significant effect on support when the meancentered value of knowledge fell outside of the negative range (i.e., values above zero). Because the mean-centered knowledge variable has four levels, ranging from Ϫ1.66 to 1.31 (low to high), these results translate into fairness influencing people who rated their knowledge as 1 or 2 (which are negative values when mean centered), and outcome prediction influencing people who rated their knowledge as 3 or 4 (which are positive values when mean centered).
Figure 3 graphically depicts the interactions by using the full model from Step 2 of Table 5 (including the time control variable), plugging in the mean and one standard deviation above and below the mean for all variables. The figure clearly illustrates that the effects of fairness on policy support are greater at lower levels of knowledge (top panel), whereas the effects of predicted outcome favorability are greater at higher levels of knowledge (bottom panel).
Discussion
The panel survey results provide strong support for the hypotheses. Because the survey was administered in the field to a representative sample of the general population facing a real proposed policy initiative, the findings do not suffer from some of the common criticisms of experimental research, such as limited generalizability. Moreover, including two waves of panel data controls for measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity of individual respondents, rendering the results more stable and reliable than cross-sectional survey data. Thus, the current study adds additional support for the present theoretical account and adds external validity to the causal evidence of the first two experiments by showing that the findings hold across a range of settings, including a field setting with real and important consequences.
General Discussion
There are many instances in which individuals must react to a proposed decision, change, or new initiative. Even though the proposal might have uncertain consequences for those affected by it, people must still determine whether they support the initiative. Three studies using public policy contexts that included both laboratory experiments and longitudinal field survey data provide consistent evidence that the extent to which people rely on their outcome predictions or their procedural fairness judgments depends on their subjective feelings of their own knowledge in a particular domain. Procedural fairness influenced policy support primarily for people experiencing ambiguity surrounding their knowledge (see top of Figures 1, 2, and 3) . In contrast, when individuals feel relatively knowledgeable in the domain they are assessing they seem to be more influenced by their predictions of how the consequences would affect them (see bottom of Figures 1,  2, and 3) .
This article contributes to the understanding of the cognitive underpinnings of the fair process effect and provides a specific decision theoretic conceptualization of uncertainty that has not been studied in prior justice research. As noted earlier, the notion have distinguished between informational and personal (self) uncertainty. Using this very general dichotomy, the subjective knowledge construct in the present article might be broadly construed as a type of subjective informational uncertainty (that might also have implications for personal uncertainty). But more precisely, in the present article the uncertainty people experience stems from having to decide a course of action (e.g., support for a new initiative) on the basis of a prediction or forecast of consequences, taking into account how knowledgeable they feel when making that prediction. Because we are unable to know the future, a prediction of consequences entails some uncertainty, and the subjective knowledge moderator is akin to the psychological experience of ambiguity as discussed in the judgment under uncertainty literature (e.g., Ellsberg, 1961; Fox & Weber, 2002; Heath & Tversky, 1991) . The findings from the present investigation suggest that people selectively attend to both procedural fairness and forecasted outcomes as a function of confidence in their knowledge. These findings have implications for the literature on human judgment under uncertainty and ambiguity, which has typically emphasized people's explicit consideration of forecasted outcomes and consequences (but see Rottenstreich & Kivetz, 2006) often to the exclusion of other factors. It seems that people rely on their own predictions if they feel competent or certain about their knowledge, but when they feel less knowledgeable they may be reliably drawn to different, more social or procedural sources of information, such as fairness of procedures or trust (or perhaps even moral heuristics, e.g., see Sunstein, 2004) .
It is worth noting that the dependent measure in the current investigation, support for initiatives, is intentional or attitudinal, rather than behavioral. Although this measure is commonly used in the social justice literature and was thus chosen to yield comparable insights to past work, future research incorporating behavioral measures would add further intriguing and convincing evidence. Despite the limitation of not including a behavioral dependent variable, the present investigation has other empirical advantages gained by the uncommon multimethod approach using both experimental and survey data, which demonstrates the robustness and generalizability of the hypothesized relationships across both lab and field settings.
Global Versus Specific Procedural Fairness Judgments
In some of the studies reported here, the measure of perceived fairness is a general overall, or global, procedural fairness judgment, rather than a judgment pertaining to the fairness of the specific decision-making procedure in question. The use of global fairness judgments to predict reactions follows a great deal of empirical and theoretical work in fairness heuristic theory (e.g., Lind, 2001; Lind et al., 1993) . For instance, Lind et al. (1993) demonstrated that an overall procedural fairness heuristic judgment mediated the effects of specific process perceptions on outcome satisfaction. More recently, justice researchers have provided evidence that global justice judgments are predictive of people's reactions and attitudes beyond facet justice dimensions (e.g., Ambrose & Schminke, in press; Holtz & Harold, 2007; Jones & Martens, 2007) . These findings support the use of global fairness judgments as reliable predictors of people's support for new initiatives.
The prominence of global fairness judgments in people's minds prompts the important empirical question of how such fairness heuristic are formed. Although we know a great deal about the antecedents to specific procedural justice judgments within a defined decision context (see Colquitt et al., 2001) , we know very little about the formation of global fairness heuristic judgments over time. It is conceivable that people form heuristic fairness judgments composed of a host of past experiences, and additional data from the panel survey (Study 3) provides some suggestive evidence of this. In particular, one section of the survey instrument asked respondents to answer questions about a recent experience they had with a government official. Interjected in later sections of the instrument, participants were asked the items used in the Study 3 analyses that concerned their global fairness judgments of state government, their outcome prediction, and their policy support. Bivariate correlations revealed that participants' past experiences with procedures and outcomes were unrelated to predictions of future outcomes or support for the policy. But nearly all past experience variables affected the global procedural fairness judgment, which in turn affected policy support. The correlations provide some modest evidence for the notion that past experiences might mostly influence responses as filtered by a global fairness heuristic. Future research should use repeated measures experimental designs to examine how these past experiences are weighed in the formation of fairness heuristics, when such judgments are updated by new information, and how consciously people draw on this information.
Connections to Heuristic Processing Accounts
Prior work has examined the use of procedural fairness as a substitute for missing information that is inherently social, such as trustworthiness of an authority (Van den Bos et al., 1998) or social comparison information regarding one's own and others' outcomes ( Van den Bos, et al., 1997) . The findings here show that fairness can be used to substitute for more cognitive information, namely perceived subject matter knowledge. Weighing fairness more heavily when one is missing information is consistent with the concept of attribute substitution, the psychological process proposed to underlie heuristic judgment in behavioral decision research (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) . Attribute substitution occurs when individuals attempt to assess one attribute by substituting a different heuristic property that comes to mind more readily, a process that is presumed to occur nonconsciously. In recalling past experiences, it is conceivable that people find procedural and interpersonal incidents more accessible, and such heightened accessibility in memory would lead people to treat those incidents as diagnostic of future events (Feldman & Lynch, 1988) . It is possible that experiencing ambiguity surrounding one's knowledge limits the capacity for individuals to deliberately reason through the meaning and predicted consequences of a particular decision or initiative, thus shifting their attention to fairness or other heuristics.
Alternatively, it may not necessarily be the case that people are processing information superficially when they draw on their process fairness judgments. Tiedens and Linton (2001) , for example, found that individuals who experienced uncertainty induced through affect tended to evaluate information more deeply relative to those who were induced with certainty-associated emotions. Because procedural justice is a multidimensional construct that incorporates both the structural quality of the decision-making system and some aspects of group inclusion (i.e., voice) and social treatment (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Colquitt et al., 2001; Leventhal et al., 1980) , it might be viewed as a reasonably diagnostic cue that actually signals systematic processing of available information. This article can only generally characterize the current set of findings as a cue substitution process. Future research should attempt to tease apart these various underlying heuristic processing accounts with respect to the current set of findings.
Relationship to Other Process and Outcome Effects
Because the current article is focused on situations in which outcomes have not yet transpired, no hypothesis was made regarding whether an interaction between procedural fairness and predicted outcomes would occur and mimic the often replicated interaction between procedural fairness and (known, or certain) outcome judgments (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996) . Results of the full factorial in Table 3 , however, indicates that there was no significant interaction of fairness and predicted outcome and no three-way interaction of fairness, prediction, and knowledge for Study 2 (for findings regarding Studies 1 and 3, refer to Footnotes 4 and 6).
The absence of the process by outcome interaction in this case might imply that different psychological processes are in play when people are looking toward a forecasted outcome versus making sense of an outcome that has already been realized. In other words, when making sense of an outcome that is known, individuals retrospectively look to both process and outcome and weigh one more or less heavily depending on the level of the other, as has been previously shown (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996) . But when making sense of an outcome that is anticipated, the present theoretical account uniquely argues that people assess their internal feeling of knowledge and weigh either process cues (as knowledge decreases) or outcome cues (as knowledge increases) more heavily. Future research should attempt to address the full nature of the interaction of process and outcome under various subjective knowledge conditions in the context of a study that includes both forecasted and realized outcomes.
The moderating effect of knowledge on both process and outcome evaluations demonstrated in this article resembles conceptually similar effects documented in other fields. In fields as diverse as political science and consumer behavior, several studies suggest that the moderating effect of subjective knowledge on sensitivity to procedure versus outcome predictions might be a more general phenomenon that (a) extends to procedural characteristics beyond justice and fairness and (b) holds in situations in which people are making their own decisions. For example, in the context of political decision making, Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida (1994) found that voters with less political sophistication (which might in part reflect subjective knowledge) were more sensitive to structural differences in the way candidates were presented to them (a process characteristic). In a marketing context, Godek, Brown, and Yates (2002) tested the prediction that aspects of a consumer purchase decision process would affect overall consumption satisfaction. They found that process evaluations only affected satisfaction for consumers who reported low knowledge of the product. The authors concluded that process evaluations do not have an impact when consumers can reach a reasonable value assessment of the selected product on their own and that it is only when consumers have little basis for assessing value that they turn to process evaluations. These findings suggest that the moderating effect of subjective knowledge on sensitivity to procedure versus predictions is a more general phenomenon that extends beyond justice and fairness effects.
Furthermore, research on individual decision making has revealed that people experience more satisfaction with their own decisions when they use a process that fits with their own regulatory focus, which is a value system or orientation to the world (Higgins, 2000) . Brockner (2003) noted that a process that fits one's regulatory focus might affect satisfaction with outcomes in a manner that mimics the fair process effect, and hence procedural fairness and fit might both be manifestations of a more general phenomenon. From the perspective of the current article, one might expect that individuals are most affected by value from fit when they lack knowledge to assess the outcome. Future research should attempt to verify whether knowledge moderates reliance on process versus outcome judgments across many individual and group decision contexts. The hope is that the current investigation will prompt additional interdisciplinary research into these questions.
